PAD|People's Alliance for Democracy
This is the unofficial/personal blog site from one PAD member.

Human Rights Watch has a report out on the Thai violence. Some interesting tid-bits:

- Video footage and still photos showed some soldiers firing M16 and TAR21 assault rifles in the air with live ammunition throughout that afternoon. Human Rights Watch has obtained photos showing that magazines of those assault rifles were loaded with the live ammunition (green-tipped 5.56-mm ball M855 ammunition). Teargas canisters were thrown from a military helicopter at the protesters, risking death and serious injuries among protestors from the falling canisters.

- The situation on April 10 became more violent after nightfall as both sides engaged in gunfights. The protesters regrouped and fought back with metal pipes and sharpened bamboo sticks. Some of them hurled petrol bombs at the soldiers, while others attacked the soldiers with improvised explosive devices. Some soldiers were filmed shooting with live ammunition directly at the protesters with M16 and TAR21 assault rifles.

- On the night of April 10, protesters armed with M16 and AK47 assault rifles fired upon soldiers at Khok Wua Intersection on Rajdamnoen Road. Some of them fired M79 grenades and threw M67 hand grenades at the soldiers. Video footage showed that these gunmen operated with a high degree of skill and coordination. Some of their attacks appeared to be aimed specifically at killing and maiming commanding officers of the army units involved in crowd dispersal operations.

- Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that some UDD protesters stopped ambulances on their way to hospitals. They dragged injured soldiers out of the ambulances and beat them.

- UDD leader Nathawut publicly urged protesters to loot and destroy high-end shopping malls in that area. While under pressure from the military to clear the area, Abhisit ordered the government not to attempt to disperse the UDD protesters at Ratchaprasong intersection for fear of heavy casualties and damages.

- “Prime Minister Abhisit’s announcement that he will investigate the conduct of the security forces is unprecedented, but he needs to show the will and ability to follow through,” said Adams. “At the same time, regardless of their stated grievances, those in the UDD responsible for crimes must be brought to justice. The UDD’s leaders should understand that when they use violence, they cannot claim to be a peaceful movement.”

full, lengthy report at following address:
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/04/12/thailand-end-political-violence-bring-offenders-justice

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one more video to add to the collection. this one shows the red mob terrorizing a hospital

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sf3Ii_Qm-1o

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You need understand who make Thaksin :
George Soros, they working together for Carlyle group in front Thailand.

Thailand’s financial crisis: its causes, consequences, and implications.
Publication: Journal of Economic Issues
Publication Date: 01-MAR-07 Format: Online
Delivery: Immediate Online Access
Full Article Title: Thailand’s financial crisis: its causes, consequences, and implications.(Report)

“The literature on Thailand’s financial crisis includes Leighmer 1999, 2000, 2002, forthcoming; Alam and Leighmer 2001; and Leightner and Alam 2002. The story of the Thai crisis has parallels in the Japanese stories told by Ozawa (1999; 2003) and in the South Korean stories told by Zalewski (1999a; 1999b; 2002). The risks that Grabel (1999; 2000) warns of for Asia, the invidious distinction and conspicuous consumption that Elliott and Harvey (2000) warn of for Jamaica, and the problems with absentee ownership and the menace of competition that Atkinson (1999) warns of for globalization have counterparts in the Thai story. After summarizing the literature on the relationship between capital account liberalization and crises, Eichengreen (2004) argues that capital account liberalization is “unavoidable”; however, the pace of liberalization needs to be controlled and correctly sequenced to minimize the risks of future crises. Specifically, domestic financial markets need to be liberalized first and prudential supervision strengthened; foreign direct investment liberalized second; stock and bond markets third; and offshore banking last. The Thai case started with Thailand setting up an offshore banking center.”

“These events created a run on all finance companies, especially the ones cited for being weak. The speculative bubble in the Thai property market affected finance companies much more than banks because a relatively high percentage of finance company loans were to the property market. Furthermore, the BIBF licenses held by all Thai banks made it possible for them to obtain funds (from overseas) much cheaper than Thai finance companies could, (because finance companies could only raise funds from domestic deposits). Even prior to the BIBF, the playing field between Thailand’s 15 commercial banks and its 91 finance/securities companies was biased in favor of the banks. The BIBF made this bias worse and there was serious concern that all 91 of Thailand’s finance and securities companies would go bankrupt (Leightner 1999; forthcoming; see also Atkinson 1999, on the menace of competition; and Elliott and Harvey 2000, on invidious distinction).

George Soros used the above events and concerns in order to lead a speculative attack on the Thai baht–the official currency of Thailand. To understand speculative currency attacks, one must understand how fixed exchange rates are maintained. If an exchange rate is fixed above equilibrium, then a surplus of the currency emerges and the government must buy up this surplus (paying for it with foreign reserves) in order to keep the exchange rate from falling. If an exchange rate is fixed below equilibrium, then a shortage of the currency emerges and the government can maintain the fixed exchange rate by printing more currency and exchanging it for additional foreign reserves.

This author does not know the actual amounts of money used in George Soros’ speculative attack against the Thai baht in the spring of 1997; therefore, the numbers used in this paragraph to illustrate how a speculative attack is conducted are hypothetical. First, George Soros bought forward currency contracts on the baht in the spring of 1997. Forward currency contracts are legal agreements to exchange currency at an agreed upon rate at some date in the future. Perhaps these forward contracts gave Soros the option of selling baht at the rate of one US$ for 26 baht in January of 1998. Next Soros sells all of his baht, convinces all of his friends to sell their baht, and advertises the current problems of the Thai economy (see above) in an effort to get others to sell their baht. Soros advertised Thailand’s problems because he wanted to create a panic where all foreign investors would want to sell their baht immediately for fear its value was on the verge of collapse. As everyone begins selling baht (and no one wants to buy it), the Thai government must buy up the resulting surplus in order to maintain the fixed exchange rate. Thailand spent US$6.8 billion and committed at least an additional US$23.4 billion in forward obligations in an effort to maintain the fixed exchange rate (Leightner 1999; note Thailand had US$39 billion of foreign reserves in January 1997). On July 2, 1997, the BOT gave up its fixed exchange rate and floated the baht (stopped buying and selling to keep the baht’s value fixed). By January 1998, the baht had fallen to US$1 for 54 baht. In January 1998, George Soros could exchange US$1 billion for 54 billion baht on the spot market (the market using current prices). He could then use his forward contracts to exchange the 54 billion baht for more than US$2 billion–more than doubling his money. (2) Soros took advantage of Thailand’s problems to make a huge personal profit and in the process Thailand was devastated.

Institutional Consequences of the Crisis: Credit

When the value of the baht fell from US$1 for 25 baht in June of 1997 to US$1 dollar for 54 baht in January of 1998, the dollar value of Thai exports was halved and the price Thailand had to pay for imports doubled. Thailand fell into a serious recession. On August 19, 1997, Thailand accepted a US$17.2 billion from the IMF and the World Bank. This loan came with conditions, which would cause the Thai economy to contract further, but had the implicit goal of improving foreign investor confidence in the Thai economy. (3) One condition of the loan was that the Thai government not rescue additional financial institutions. By May of 1998, only 35 finance and securities companies remained of the original 91 and the Thai government took over seven of the remaining firms. The Thai government also took over four of Thailand’s fifteen commercial banks (Leightner 2002).”

“Institutional Consequences of the Crisis: Political

Chavalit, Thailand’s prime minister when the crisis began, resigned under tremendous pressure on November 3, 1997. Chuan Leekpai, who had been prime minister from September 1992 to May 1995, took over as Thailand’s new prime minister. Chuan had the reputation for being a cautious and incorruptible leader. This change in leadership improved international expectations and the Thai baht increased in value for a short amount of time. However, the depth of the domestic problems caused by the recession-producing IMF program and Chuan’s reputation for cautiousness caused the Thais to embrace a new, more daring, political party in the January 2001 elections. This new political party was created by a billionaire Thai businessman named Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin was one of the few Thais who gained financially from the collapse of the Thai baht (McCargo and Pathmanand 2005). The political party that Thaksin created was called the “Thai Love Thai” (Thai Rak Thai) party.

Immediately prior to the Thai crisis, the Thais had spent a considerable amount of time and effort writing a new constitution. One of the major improvements in this new constitution was much stronger safeguards against political corruption. Under this new constitution, a Counter-Corruption Commission examined the assets of all politicians. Any politicians found guilty of corruption were outlawed from politics for five years. Prior to the January 2001 elections, the Counter-Corruption Commission found that Thaksin had hid some of his assets. Thaksin was not immediately thrown out of politics because the Constitutional Court began investigating his case. Thaksin won the January 2001 election with the biggest landslide victory in Thai history. In August 2001, the Constitutional Court acquitted Thaksin (with an extremely controversial 8 to 7 decision). Two of the casualties of these events were the credibility of the Counter-Corruption Commission and of the Constitutional Court. (4)”

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Thaksin earn money during the crisis because he was aware of the attack on the baht by Loved friend, George Soros.
He is complicit in the crisis and took the opportunity to take power!

problems that Thailand is currently experiencing are not unique, Carlyle launched attacks to take political and economic control in many countries.

remember the old adage: divide and rule

Do not hate the red, they are handled by professionals who have done this in many countries.

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